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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
MENTAL CONDITION OF: 
WARD M., 
No. 13809 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On June 13, 1974 application was filed 
with the District Court of Salt Lake County,< 
State of Utah, requesting the involuntary 
hospitalization of the Appellant. (R. 65-
66). Thereafter, pursuant to provisions 
of Utah law and the practices of the Court, 
a hearing was held before Margaret K. Spratley, 
Special Commissioner, resulting in an Order 
of Hospitalization, dated June 26, 1974 
(R. 5052). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On June 27, 1974 Appellant, through counsel, 
petitioned for a new hearing pursuant to Section 
64-7-36(L), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
(R. 49). The hearing was held on the 2nd day 
of August, 1974 before the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson. 
Prior to the Hearing, the Court had 
appointed three designated examiners, Glen E. 
Johnson, M.D., Gary Stevenson, M.D. and 
David Wood, M.D., to examine the Appellant 
and report their findings to the Court. All 
three doctors testified that the proposed patient 
was mentally ill. (Tr. 6, 8, 11). None felt 
that, as a result of his mental illness, he was 
an immediate danger to himself or others. (Tr. 
11,14,15). The doctors believed, however, that he 
lacked sufficient insight to seek voluntary care. 
(Tr. 5, 6, and 8). This conclusion was based 
primarily upon the fact that Appellant felt that 
-2-
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he would only need medication for a six-month 
period and the fact that he would consider taking 
LSD if it were legalized. (Tr. 5,6, 8). Appellant 
testified that he would continue taking medication 
as long as his doctor felt that it was necessary 
(pr. 19) and that he had not taken LSD since 1970 
(Tr. 28). He further testified that he had 
benefited from treatment at the Utah State 
Hospital (Tr. 19), where he had been sent 
after the initial Order of Hospitalization. 
Appellant's counsel moved for a dismissal 
of the case because the standards for involuntary 
hospitalization had not been met beyond a reason-
able doubt, and he requested that the court use 
the reasonable doubt standard of proof. (Tr. 18) 
He further moved for dismissal because the lack 
of insight grounds for commitment were uncon-
stitutionally vague. (Tr. 18-19). Dismissal 
was also urged because Appellantfs present 
condition did not warrant involuntary 
-3-
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hospitalization. (Tr. 19). These motions 
were denied. (Tr. 24) 
The court found that Appellant was mentally 
ill and "in need of custody, care and treatment 
in a mental health facility but lacks sufficient 
insight or capacity by reason of such illness 
to make responsible decisions with respect to 
hospitalization" and ordered him hospitalized 
for an indeterminate period at the Salt Lake 
Community Mental Health Center. (R.41-42). 
This Order is the subject of this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION PROCEEDING 
WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES 
AS A VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE 
THE STATE CANNOT COMMIT A PERSON WITH ITS 
RESULTANT LOSS OF LIBERTY, WITHOUT MAKING 
A FINDING BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE NEED FOR COMMITMENT. 
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of 
Utah provides: 
-4-
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No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
This provision, almost identical in language 
to similar provisions of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, has been granted wide application 
by this Court. See McGrew v. Industrial 
Comm. 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938) where 
the court cited with approval a statement from 
Rigney v. Chicago, 102 111. 64: 
The words 'life1, 'liberty1, and 
'property1 are constitutional terns and 
they are to be taken in their broadest 
sense. They indicate the three great 
subdivisions of all civil right. 
85 P.2d at 610. 
The Utah Mental Health Services Act, Utah 
Code Annotated under Title 64 is silent with 
regard to the necessary burden of proof the Court 
must use to determine whether a hospitalization 
Order should be entered, although the trial 
court denied appellant's motion to determine 
-5-
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the case by a reasonable doubt standard. 
(Tr. 24). 
Appellant contends that his commitment 
was a violation of Due Process of Law, however, 
because there was no judicial finding of 
the statutory requirements for commitment 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." The gulf 
between the rights guaranteed in criminal proceed-
ings and those applicable to non-criminal 
proceedings is narrowing, due to the United 
States Supreme Court decisions in In re Gault 
387 U.S. 1 (1967), and in Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970), applying some due process 
protections where there is a potential deprivation 
of liberty or other important rights. 
Subsequent to Gault, the Supreme Court 
has ruled that a juvenile is constitutionally 
entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
the charges against him because of the due 
process clause. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970). The court later found the 
-6-
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reasonable doubt standard of sufficient con-
stitutional importance to give it retroactive 
application in juvenile cases. Ivan V. v. City 
of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972). This Court 
has held that the United States Supreme Court 
decisions on Federal Due Process clauses are 
" 'highly persuasive1 as to the application 
of that clause of our State Constitution." 
Untermeyer v. State Tax Comm, 102 Utah 214, 
129 P.2d 881,885 (1942 . 
The Winship court disposed of several 
arguments submitted or behalf of requiring a 
lesser standard of pre of in juvenile cases, 
all of which are applicable to involuntary 
commitment situations like those presently before 
this Court. It was argued that the criminal burden 
of proof should not apply because delinquency 
status is not a crime and the proceedings are not 
criminal. The Court, citing Gault, noted that 
a civil label will not save proceedings from 
-7-
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constitutional protections and that the 
possibility of loss of liberty is the crucial 
factor. Using similar rationale, the Court also 
rejected a claim that the criminal standard of 
proof should not apply because the purpose of 
the juvenile hearing is to save the child and 
not to punish him. Winship at 365. 
The Court also found that the use of the 
reasonable doubt standard would not destroy the 
beneficial aspects of the juvenile process. 
The Court reasoned that requiring the higher 
burden of proof at the fact finding stages of the 
proceeding is not tantamount to an interference 
with the treatment goals. Winship at 366. 
The similarities between the juvenile 
proceedings and commitment proceedings require 
that the same standard of proof apply to both. 
A person found to be commitable for mental illness 
may sometimes be getting a life sentence to a 
mental institution. (See "The Administration of 
Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in 
-8_ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Arizona," 13 Ariz. L.Rev. at 207-236). 
Indeed, prior to Winship, the United States 
Supreme Court had applied the Due Process clause 
to commitment proceedings, finding that the 
the availability of due process turned upon 
the possibility of indeterminate incarceration 
rather than whether it is labeled "civil" or 
"criminal." Sprecht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 
605 (1966). See also Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 
U.S. 107 (1965). The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 
(1968) similarly held that due process applied 
to a civil commitment proceeding for a mentally 
deficient individual and, as a result, there was 
a constitutionally protected right to counsel. 
If, where there is a deprivation of liberty, 
Due Process includes the reasonable doubt standard 
of proof, and if due process applies to commitment 
hearings, then the reasonable doubt standard 
should apply. Several courts have recognized 
this fact. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in 
-9-
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Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 
(1964) held that subjects of lunacy proceedings 
were entitled to the same burden of proof and 
rules of evidence as are available in criminal 
cases and stated: 
Although lunacy inquests are not concerned 
with criminal intent or criminal acts, 
they may result in depriving this defendant 
of his liberty and his property. This 
deprival should be obtained only by due 
process of law under constitutional guarantees. 
We have, therefore, concluded that when a 
proceeding may lead to the loss of personal 
liberty, the defendant in that proceeding 
should be afforded the same constitutional 
protection as is given to the accused in 
a criminal prosecution. 
383 S.W.2d at 682. 
In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp. 1087 
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, U.S. ,94 S.Ct. 713 (1974), a 
three-Judge Federal District Court held that the 
reasonable doubt standard was required by the 
magnitude of the deprivations involved in 
commitments. Accord, In re Ballay, 4 82 F.2d 
648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re Pickles1 Petition, 
-10-
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170 So.2d 603 (Fla.App. 1965); Ex parte 
Perry, 137 N.J. Eq. 161, 43 A.2d 885 (1945), 
and Schneider v. Radack, (So. Dakota Cir. Ct. 
First Judicial Circuit, decision dated May 3, 
1974, 2 Pov. L. Rep. para. 19,349). 
The Supreme Court of the State of 
Washington, citing Winship, supra, and Lessard, 
supra, found that the clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence standard, or the civil 
counterpart of the criminal reasonable 
doubt standard, was required in mental illness 
proceedings and stated: 
Any lesser standard of proof permits 
a deprivation of personal liberty 
through improper suspension of the strict 
requirements of due process. In re 
Levias, 517 P.2d 588,590,591 (1973). 
Another compelling reason for application 
of the reasonable doubt standard is the fact 
that the Utah procedure, as a practical matter, 
allows for very little affirmative presentation 
of a defense to commitment. The Statute con-
-11-
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templates the primary responsibility for 
presentation of evidence is that of the designated 
examiners, and the proposed patient's defense 
often consists almost entirely of cross-examination 
of these expert witnesses. The danger of requiring 
a less stringent standard of proof is apparent, 
particularly where the expert opinion may prove 
to be incorrect. (See e.g. Rosenham, "On Being 
Sane in Insane Places, Science, January 19,1973, 
at 250, where eight normal or sane persons gained 
admission to twelve different psychiatric 
hospitals and, in eleven of the twelve cases 
were incorrectly diagnosed as schizophrenic 
although they acted normally in all cases. 
The length of hospitalization of these 
individuals ranged from 7 to 52 days, with 
an average stay of 19 days.) 
Thus, the reason;1 justifying a strict 
standard of proof in commitment hearings is 
compelling. Each of the bases cited for such 
a standard by the Winship Court is present: 
-12-
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The requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt has this vital role in our 
criminal procedure for cogent reasons• The 
accused during a criminal prosecution has at 
stake interests of immense important, both 
because of the possibility that he may lose 
his liberty upon conviction and because of the 
certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction . . . As we said in Speiser v. 
Randall,. . .: "There is always in litigation 
a margin of error representing error in fact 
finding, which both parties must take into 
account. Where one party has at stake an 
interest of transcending value—as a criminal 
defendant has his liberty—this margin of 
error is reduced as to him by the process 
of placing on the other party the burden of 
. . .persuading the factfinder at the 
conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.'1 387 U.S. at 363-364 
(1970). (Emphasis added). 
Involuntary commitment does involve a loss of 
liberty and a stigma and a factual judgment with 
a significant margin of error and proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt should be required. 
POINT II 
THE LACK OF CAPACITY OR INSIGHT STANDARD 
OF §64-7-36(H)(3) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
DEFICIENT BECAUSE IT ALLOWS TOO MUCH 
DISCRETION IN THE FACTFINDER. 
Appellant contends that the lack of capacity 
or insight basis for commitment is unconstitutional 
because it grants too much discretion in determinin 
-13-
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the individuals to whom it applies. He concedes 
that it does not, on its face, violate the 
traditional rationale of the Vagueness Doctrine. 
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967). It is uncon-
stitutional because it allows too much discretion 
with the factfinder. 
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156 (1972) , the Supreme Court unanimously 
invalidated a vagrancy ordinance partly because 
the absence of objective standards invited the 
possibility of "arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." The court reasoned that the 
indefinite terms could be used to require 
individuals "to comport themselves according 
to the life style deemed appropriate by 
the Jacksonville police and the courts." 
405 U.S. at 170. 
The commitment standard in question here 
is subject to exactly the same abuses and, 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for that reason, should be declared invalid, 
S e e
 In re Sealy, 218 So.2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1969) , where the Florida Appellate Court 
reversed an involuntary commitment of a young 
man where the only evidence of his mental illness 
was a life style which made him a "typical Hippie." 
218 So.2d at 768. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SHOWN THAT 
APPELLANT MET THE STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR 
COMMITMENT AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING. 
The Appellant testified that he was willing to 
continue with medication and treatment under 
the supervision of his physician (Tr. 19-20). The 
evidence supporting Appellant!s alleged lack of 
insight consisted of the possibility that, at 
some time in the future, he might refuse to 
follow through with treatment or consider the 
possibility of taking LSD if that drug became 
legalized. 
Section 64-7-36 (H) is written in the 
-15-
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present tense and should be limited to an 
inquiry into the proposed patient's mental 
health at the time of the hearing. Any doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the individual's 
right to freedom. In re Pickles Petition, supra. 
Since Appellant's alleged lack of insight 
is based upon some contingency which may or 
may not occur in the future, the Order of the 
Court was improper and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing held in the District Court in 
the instant matter, having failed to comply 
with due process of law because it utilized an 
improper standard of proof, the "lack of insight 
or capacity" test for commitment allowing too 
much discretion with the factfinder, and the 
facts in the record not clearly showing that the 
Appellant met the standards for involuntary 
hospitalization at the time of the hearing, 
this Court should reverse the judgment of 
-16-
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the District Court. As Mr. Justice Brandeis 
stated in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 
438 (1928): 
Experience should teach us to be 
most on our guard to protect liberty 
where the Government's purposes are 
beneficent." 227 U.S. at 479. 
(Dissenting opinion). 
DAVID E. LITTLEFIELD 
Attorney for Appellant 
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